Empire Notes
"We don't seek empires. We're not imperialistic. We never have been. I
can't imagine why you'd even ask the question." Donald Rumsfeld,
questioned by an al-Jazeera correspondent, April 29, 2003.
"No one can now doubt the word of America," George W. Bush, State of
the Union, January 20, 2004.
April 7, 11:20 am
EST. Baghdad, Iraq -- A major atrocity is unfolding in Fallujah
and
Ramadi. Everyone tells us that the towns are cordoned off, with
electricity and water cut and no supplies allowed in. A mosque in
Fallujah was just destroyed, with 40 dead. The total dead in fighting
for the two towns is 30
American soldiers and over 150 Iraqis -- probably far over, given
the difficulties of counting. A fitting response to the killing of the
four Blackwater Security mercenaries. Of course, if the condition of
siege continues much longer, the death toll even among noncombatants in
Fallujah and Ramadi will skyrocket.
As we were driving back from Kadhimiyah (a Shi'a district), we passed
through Aadhamiyah. In front of the Abu Hanifa mosque (the same area
where Saddam was shown walking around last April 9 -- Aadhamiyah is
still a Saddamist stronghold), we noticed a major traffic snarl and
hundreds of people milling around.
It was a massive volunteer relief effort for Fallujah and Ramadi.
Coordinated from mosques around the city, which told people to go to
Abu Hanifa if they wanted to give for Falluja and Ramadi, the hours-old
effort had already collected five truckloads of food and supplies, as
well as substantial amounts of money. They were bringing staple foods
-- flour, potatoes, dates, oil -- and also a staggering number of
burial shrouds.
Even more remarkable, doctors from Baghdad's central blood bank
(located in Aadhamiyah) had come to the mosque and literally thousands
of people lined up to donate blood. The doctors had only 500 blood bags
and it was a mob scene as people fought to be the ones to give blood.
One man told me he had had a heart attack but he was still going to
give blood.
The anger that came through when people spoke to me as palpable -- I
could literally feel it on my skin as people yelled in my face so fast
that I had no hope of keeping up as I took notes. Women in hijab yelled
at me that they would go and fight in Fallujah. Even so, people were
kind and helpful -- a civil engineer who spoke good English actually
took me around and translated for me, and several people pointed out to
me that money was falling out of my pockets.
Although the relief was going to the Sunni areas of Fallujah and Ramadi
(and Aadhamiyah is overwhelmingly Sunni), many people made a point of
saying that if Kufa or Najaf, Shi'a towns, were under siege they would
give for them too (Kufa is Moqtada's stronghold). One woman who gave
her name only as Umm Saif (mother of Saif), said, "We are all united
against the Americans."
Well, Bush is proving himself as a uniter, not a divider. If the siege
is not lifted soon, however, the people of Fallujah and Ramadi will pay
a heavy price for that.
April 7, 10:08 am
EST. Baghdad, Iraq -- I'm still getting used to this business of
reporting
the news
instead of knowing it. That paradox for foreign journalists covering
any kind of situation is that often they are the people who know the
least about what's going on. Not speaking Arabic, I can't turn on the
TV or radio at all hours of the night, and I'm limited to the few hours
a day I can snatch in an Internet cafe.
Even so, there's a lot I've found to report. It goes on the blog first,
then everywhere else.
Over the past two days, we've visited the al-Sadr people in three
districts of Baghdad -- Sadr City (Thawra), Shuala, and Kadhimiyah. We
talked with a variety of people of different ranks -- al-Sadr's people
are thoroughly jaded when it comes to journalists, and, of course,
unimpressed by mere print media. Anyway, I've put together some
impressions.
Let me start by saying that the Sadrists are certainly extremists. They
believe in Khomeini's Vilayet al-Faqih -- Islamic theocracy. They shout
"Death to America" and "Death to the Jews." Still, despite extreme
provocation, they all say that they have orders not to fight back, even
as the U.S. forces attack peaceful demonstrations and wreak havoc in
firefights across half of Iraq. They maintain, in fact, that those who
shoot back at the occupying forcess are not from their Mehdi Army but
simply people from the areas -- certainly a plausible claim, although
impossible to verify.
They are definitely organizing -- when we were in Thawra, the
headquarters was alive with planning, mostly done in whispers when we
were near. It's pretty clear, though, that the plans are defensive.
They expect many more rounds of American attacks, and they want to be
prepared. None of them seems to think they have the wherewithal to
attack.
Moqtada al-Sadr is a very young man -- often reported as 30, but he may
be as young as his early 20's. He obviously had no time to advance far
in the Shi'a clerical hierarchy, which requires much study and learning
and, for the higher levels, demonstrated skill in interpretation of
Islamic law. By rights, he should not be a player.
He's drawing his support from two starkly different pools. This was
dramatically illustrated when we went to his madrassa in Kadhimiyah. We
spoke there with the head imam at the Musa al-Kadhim mosque (this was
attacked on Ashura, with about 60 dead), Hazem al-Arajy. He was forced
to flee Iraq in 1999, when Moqtada al-Sadr's father, Grand Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was killed by Saddam. He lived in Vancouver
until two months ago, when he persuaded by the people of Kadhimiayah to
return.
I asked him why he, a senior cleric, would follow a young man like
Moqtada. He said, "Moqtada and I are both following Mohammed Sadiq
al-Sadr." Questioned further, he went on to say that in every area
there was a different authority speaking for Sadiq al-Sadr; in
Kadhimiyah, it was he.
While we were talking, in the background, young men who had just
finished prayers were chanting forcefully, "Moqtada, Moqtada, Moqtada,
Yallah, Ya Mohammed, Ya Ali, Ya Mehdi."
Ya is the Arabic vocative construction, used when addressing someone.
Allah is God, Mohammed is the last prophet, Ali was the fourth caliph,
but is regarded by the Shi'a as the legitimate successor of Mohammed
(unlike the first three), and is the founder of Shi'ism. The Mehdi (or
Mahdi) in Shi'a belief is the Twelfth Imam, who went into hiding in 874
AD and will come back to lead them to glory. I don't somehow think that
the people juxtaposing Moqtada with all of the above would agree that
he was just one of many spokespeople for the dead Grand Ayatollah.
Many of the more "respectable" people follow or align with Moqtada
because of their respect for his father -- who was not only one of the
marja'iya ("sources of emulation") but was also a native Iraqi, unlike
Sistani.
At the same time, there is the "sanctions generation" -- kids who grew
up under U.S.-imposed deprivation in a society going into an inexorable
decay. A young man of 18 today would have been 4 when Saddam invaded
Kuwait. He has known only malnutrition in his youth, decay of an
educational and health care system, possibly illiteracy (Iraq was the
only country in the world where the literacy rate decreased during the
1990's). As Denis Halliday, former U.N. humanitarian coordinator for
Iraq, warned years ago, these young men were fodder for any extremist
ideology, most naturally of course for Islamic extremism.
Those young men are the shock troops of Moqtada al-Sadr. Some of them
may even see him as the Mehdi. They are also, as with so many of the
enemies the United States now faces, a creation of the United States.
April 7, 3:30 am EST.
Baghdad, Iraq -- I've just posted a new article -- " Report
from Baghdad: Opening the Gates of Hell." We're off to Kadhimiya
now.
April 6, 1:00 am EST.
Baghdad, Iraq -- When you read this post, please refer to this partial timeline
of recent events (I've added to it since yesterday) and to this background on the Shi'a.
The United
States
has opened the gates of hell. First, it picked another fight with
Fallujah. The
grisly incident in which the charred corpses of four U.S.
mercenaries were dragged through town and (some of them) hung from a
bridge was
a reaction to a raid on March 26, in which the United
States killed at least 7 Iraqi
civilians.
The U.S.
response of putting a military cordon around the town and planning a
major
operation will, of course, turn the entire population of Fallujah
against them,
if they hadn't already been turned against them by the numerous
massacres of
civilians already committed in Fallujah.
But antagonizing the Sunni Arabs who have been the heart of the
military
resistance to the occupation was not enough for the CPA. For some
reason known
only to them, they decided to pick a fight with the Shi'a as well, in
particular with Moqtada al-Sadr, a fierce opponent of the occupation
with an armed militia of 10,000 (the Mahdi Army).
Although al-Sadr opposes the occupation, he
had been clearly avoiding violent resistance.
Then, on March 28, came the CPA's closure
of his newspaper,
al-Hawza. Why the CPA closed it is unclear; certainly it was a
phenomenally stupid move, in addition to being undemocratic. The
paper's circulation was only 10,000, mostly Sadrists. Sadr supporters
organized numerous demonstrations. The CPA did further raids on Sadr's
offices, arresting some of his aides.
Then on Sunday, things turned very violent, starting with an incident
in Najaf where occupying forces fired (provoked either by gunfire or
stone-throwing) on Sadr supporters, killing at least 14 (four soldiers
were killed as well). Sadr's Mahdi Army (Mahdi is a term that refers to
the Hidden Imam, the 12th Imam, who went into hiding in 874 AD and is
expected to return to save the Shi'a) then was involved in numerous
clashes with U.S. forces. In the past couple of days, well over 60
Iraqis and at least 12 U.S. soldiers have been killed.
Bremer declared Sadr an
outlaw and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
Thawra, a slum of 2 million mostly Shi'a in Baghdad, and a stronghold
of Sadr's, was cordoned off while U.S. forces made reprisal raids,
using Apache helicopters in residential areas. As with Falluja,
presumably anyone in Thawra who wasn't a supporter of Sadr will be
after this.
Sadr took sanctuary in his mosque in Kufa, his base. He left his
followers with these words:
Make your enemy afraid, for it is impossible
to
remain quiet about their moral offenses; otherwise we have arrived at
consequences that will not be praiseworthy. I am with you, and shall
not forsake you to face hardships alone. I fear for you, for no benefit
will come from demonstrations. Your enemy loves terrorism, and despises
peoples, and all Arabs, and muzzles opinions. I beg you not to resort
to demonstrations, for they have become nothing but burned paper. It is
necessary to resort to other measures, which you take in your own
provinces. As for me, I am with you, and I hope I will be able to join
you and then we shall ascend into exalted heavens. I will go into an
inviolable retreat in Kufa. Help me by whatever you are pleased to do
in your provinces.
Since the United States doesn't care about the popular will, as evinced
by demonsrations, the Shi'a must resort to "other measures." This is a
not-so-veiled call for violent resistance of some kind. And, of course,
over 60 demonstrators were killed as well.
BTW, when Sadr says he will "go into an inviolable retreat," this seems
pretty clearly to be a reference to one of the central Shi'a beliefs:
the Twelfth Imam, persecuted by the caliphate, went into hiding in 874
AD, and will emerge at the right time to lead the Shi'a to triumph.
Making even a loose parallel between yourself and the Hidden Imam is a
way to assert your standing among the Shi'a.
To use military terminology, right now in Iraq things are probably at
Defcon 3. They don't reach Defcon 1 unless Sistani weighs in with a
call for violent resistance. This is unlikely in the extreme, but the
dynamic that has been unleashed is such that he is forced to lend some
degree of support to Sadr. Sistani's
spokesman said that Sistani called on demonstrators not to
retaliate against occupying forces even if they face aggression, but
said that Sistani believes "the demonstrators’ demands are legitimate,"
and "condemns acts waged by the occupation forces and pledges his
support to the families of the victims."
This occupation's combination of brutality and fecklessness shows
itself in the boldest relief once again. With Shi'a and Sunni erupting,
the only response it can think of is military measures -- even though
it was the same kind of measures that got it into this mess. Bush's
saying that Sadr and his followers are fighting because they don't want
to " allow
democracy to flourish" is simply absurd and inflammatory --
everybody here understands that closing down a newspaper is an
anti-democratic act. Especially since the likely reasons are either
that the paper compared Bremer with Saddam or that it expressed
solidarity with Hamas and Hezbollah.
Even if
this upsurge is contained, it's likely that this will be viewed in the
future as a turning point in the occupation.
April 6, 1:00
am
EST. Baghdad, Iraq -- Some background on the Shi'a and the two
most
politically prominent leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and
Moqtada al-Sadr.
Until recently, Shi'a participation in attacks on the U.S. military had
been minimal. For the most part, they hated Saddam just as much as the
Kurds, after the gruesome massacres with which he put down the 1991
uprising (with the support of the United States). Also, as the
majority, they have expected to get a better political deal,
whatever transpires, than they did under Saddam.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest religious leader of the
Shi'a in Iraq (leader of the four Grand Ayatollahs based in Najaf, a
holy city and center of Shi'a learning), has never preached violence
against the United States. On key issues, like the U.S. plan to
substitute a complicated and undemocratic system of regional caucuses
for the creation of an elected body that would draft the new Iraqi
constitution, he has resisted, sometimes even calling massive
demonstrations (the biggest involving 100,000 in Baghdad). Sistani is
of the "quietist" school of Islamic jurisprudence, which dictates that
clerics not directly involve themselves in politics.
The other major Shi'a figure to be reckoned with is Moqtada al-Sadr.
His father and uncle were both ayatollahs who were murdered by Saddam
Hussein. He himself holds minimal religious rank and commands nowhere
near the authority of Sistani. Al-Sadr has defined himself in
opposition to Sistani in several ways. Most basic, he is Iraqi and
Sistani is of Iranian origin. Second, according
to Juan Cole, writing in the Middle East Journal, Sadr is a
believer in Khomeini's theocratic "Vilayat i-Faqih" (Rule of the Just
Islamic Jurist) political philosophy. Third, Sadr came out early and
very forcefully against the occupation, instead of simply arguing over
the details as has Sistani. Under intense pressure, he had very
carefully calibrated his view on violent resistance: it's not called
for now, but we will remain prepared for the day when it is.
April 5,
12:05 pm
EST.
Baghdad, Iraq -- Having trouble getting my head around everything
that's
happened
recently. Undoubtedly among the most significant happenings yet and a
potential turning point in the occupation.
As a start, below is a
timeline of relevant events. While reading, remember there are two
entirely separate threads: the attacks and reprisals in Falluja and the
attacks and reprisals with Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in numerous
locations. In each one, it looks like the U.S. forces precipitated the
clashes (in terms of the proximate cause; above and beyond that is the
basic
background context of the occupation).
Timeline:
- March
26 Running
battles in Falluja in which
U.S. Marines kill an Iraqi cameraman and at least six other civilians.
At least
15 total dead, including one U.S. Marine.
- March 28
Al-Hawza, newspaper associated with
firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, closed.
Its circulation is estimated at
10,000.
- March 31 Killing of 4 Blackwater Security
mercenaries (and 5
soldiers) and dragging and hanging of corpses in Falluja. Bremer and
Kimmitt vow
retaliation.
- April 3 Thousands
of
members of al-Sadr’s Mahdi
Army march in Thawra (Sadr City), a
sprawling slum of 2 million in Baghdad. There have
been protests ever since the closing of
al-Hawza.
- April 3. U.S. forces arrest Mustafa al-Yacoub,
a key aide of al-Sadr and head of his Najaf office, for possible
involvement in the murder of Shi'a cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei in April
2003.
- April 4. Four
Salvadorean soldiers and 14
protesters are killed near the outpost of the Spanish-language
“Plus Ultra”
garrison at Najaf. Reports are conflicting. Some say gunmen from the
crowd
opened fire; others say the crowd threw rocks and drew fire in
response. Either
account seems plausible.
- April 4. U.S. forces storm al-Sadr's Baghdad
headquarters, killing two.
- April 4, 5:00 pm-midnight. Clashes
between members of the Mahdi Army and the U.S. military in
Thawra. Seven U.S. soldiers and
a variously estimated 22 or 28
Iraqis killed. Sadrists occupy three police stations in Thawra.
- April 4
al-Sadr’s militants seize
the police
headquarters and other government buildings in Kufa, his stronghold.
- April 5. U.S. forces
block off access to Falluja in preparation for a major military
operation. At least 1200 Marines are involved, as well as Iraqi
security forces.
- April 5 L. Paul Bremer III calls al-Sadr an
“outlaw” and a
warrant for his arrest is issued.
- April
5. Al-Sadr supporters
occupy the governor’s
office in Basra.
- April 5. U.S. forces attack Shiite slums in
Baghdad (al-Thawra and al-Shuala) with
Apache helicopters and with tanks
with reports of five killed. They also open fire on stone-throwing
militants
mourning the dead of Sunday. Thawra and other hot areas in Baghdad are
cordoned off.
- April 5. Moqtada al-Sadr goes into retreat in a
mosque in Kufa.
I'm being run out of the Internet cafe. People
go home
early these
days. More later.
April 5,
11:05 am
EST. Baghdad, Iraq -- Just arrived into Baghdad a few hours ago.
The trip
was a
little hairy. At a couple of points, our driver had to maneuver hard to
keep from being stopped by the thieves that frequent the western
highway in from Amman. On our way, we were forced to detour because the
occupying forces had put a military cordon around Falluja, in
preparation for serious military operations.
A tremendous amount happened while I was flying into Amman and on the
road. All hell is breaking loose in Iraq, as most of you already
know. Paradoxically, when you're in Iraq, you often have to go
and surf the Internet to find out what's happening. I'll post something
up shortly.
April 4,
11:15 am
EST. Very
serious incident in Najaf, the center of the Shi'a clergy in Iraq
and primary place of pilgrimage, along with Kerbala. A demonstration by
al-Sadr's followers, during which, apparently, Iraqi gunmen opened fire
on the Spanish garrison, who then returned fire. 14 Iraqis killed, four
Salvadorean soldiers.
This is huge. An incident just like this, except that there it was the
U.S. soldiers who fired first, in Falluja on April 28, set off the
round of violence that has subjected Falluja to so much repression ever
since and made it into a hotbed of resistance. It will be harder for
that to happen in Najaf, because of Sistani's influence, but it is
certainly possible.
Sistani will have to react to this very carefully in order to keep
al-Sadr's popularity from growing too much.
April 4,
11:00 am
EST. Just noticed this. On April 1, BBC reports that the U.N.
was forced to halt food aid to Gaza. Israel suspended shipment of
11,000 tons of food because of concerns that suicide bombers might hide
in the shipping containers. At least 600,000 people in Gaza could be
seriously affected. In fact, according to the Bertini
report of August 2002, 1.5 million Palestinians in the occupied
territories were dependent on direct food aid, and things have only
gotten worse.
I suppose suicide bombers could hide in shipping containers, although
I'm a bit confused, because this food is supposed to go into
Gaza, not
come out of it. In any case, those concerns are, to say the least,
hardly sufficient to imperil 600,000 people. The article notes that the
U.N. Relief and Works Association has cut deliveries from 60% of what
was necessary to 40%, and no longer distributes such staples as rice,
flour, and cooking oil in Gaza. Dependence on aid has skyrocketed in
the last three and a half years because of the "closures," and the
UNRWA suddenly finds itself underfunded.
Peter Hansen, chief of UNRWA, says, "If the new restrictions in Gaza
continue, I fear we could see real hunger emerge for the first time in
two generations," an odd statement, considering that the same Bertini
report said that 22.5% of children under the age of 5 suffered from
either acute or chronic malnourishment. A report
by Jean Ziegler, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Access to
Food, that came out last summer, said that 50% of people in the
occupied territories make do on one meal a day. I wonder what is the
threshold for hunger to be "real" -- must be awfully high.
Thanks to blogger Justin Podur of The Killing Train for
pointing this article out.
April 4,
9:45
am EST. Re my earlier post about the
Clarke poll -- 65% of those polled saying Clarke's testimony had not
changed their opinion of Bush -- M.K. from North Carolina says, "The
question on the Newsweek Poll about Clarke's changing one's opinion of
Bush was a bad one. Nothing could make my opinion of Bush worse than it
already is. It's as low as an opinion could be."
A good point. With most presidents, you would think the number of
people
who would say something like that was small enough that poll results
wouldn't change dramatically. With Bush, it's a different matter.
April 4,
9:30
am EST. A post from Schiphol, where for a mere 10 euros you can
get 24 hours of wireless access. Several days ago, Joseph Nye, dean of
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and coiner of the term, "soft
power," reprised the notion in an op-ed in the Post titled " A
Dollop of Deeper American Values: Why 'Soft Power' Matters in Fighting
Terrorism."
As he defines it in the piece, "Soft power is the ability to get what
we want by attracting others rather than by threatening or paying
them." More particularly, it seems to be the ability to get what "we"
want without bombing anyone, threatening very aggressively to bomb them
(mild threats are, of course, soft power), and possibly without
kidnapping them in the wee hours of the morning (I'm not sure about
this).
Certainly, most, if not all, of the horrors of U.S. control through
instruments like the World Bank and the IMF are included under the
rubric of soft power. As, of course, are influence through movies,
prized American brand names, manipulating news reporting, and
broadcasting Voice of America (al-Hurra, the new American
Arabic-language satellite TV network, is more an example of
soft-headedness -- you don't get very far by broadcasting reruns of old
moview when every other network in the Arab world is broadcasting
reports of 200,000 people in Gaza gathered for Ahmed Yassin's funeral).
Anyway, Nye has been one of the prime movers in what has now emerged as
the conventional wisdom of the liberal foreign policy establishment --
and, frankly, of any establishment figure who's not a raving
neoconservative or a raving idiot. Here's how Nye says it:
The
war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations -- Islam vs. the
West -- but rather a civil war within Islamic civilization between
extremists who use violence to enforce their vision and a moderate
majority who want such things as jobs, education, health care and
dignity as they practice their faith. We will not win unless the
moderates win. Our soft power will never attract Osama bin Laden and
the extremists. We need hard power to deal with them. But soft power
will play a crucial role in our ability to attract the moderates and
deny the extremists new recruits.
In other words, roughly, we have to take the
responsibility for
creating in the region governments, organizations, and institutions
that serve our
interests, but we won't succeed unless we realize that you can catch
more flies with honey than you can with vinegar (and simultaneously
that you can't just crush all the flies in your mailed fist). He
concludes by lamenting the administration's misplaced priorities:
With the end of the Cold War,
Americans became
more interested in budget savings than in investing in our soft power.
Even after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a bipartisan advisory group
reported that the United States spent a paltry $150 million on public
diplomacy in Muslim countries in 2002. The combined cost of the State
Department's public diplomacy programs and all our international
broadcasting that year was just over a billion dollars -- about the
same amount spent by Britain or France, countries one-fifth our size.
It is also equal to one-quarter of 1 percent of the military budget. No
one would suggest that we spend as much to launch ideas as to launch
bombs, but it does seem odd that we spend 400 times as much on hard
power as on soft power. If we spent just 1 percent of the military
budget, it would mean quadrupling our spending on soft power.
If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism,
our leaders are going to have to learn to better combine soft and hard
power into "smart power," as we did in the Cold War. We have done it
before; we can do it again.
Let's consider this just from the point of view of
dealing with the
threat posed by Islamic terrorism to the West -- i.e., leaving aside
considerations of its far greater threat to people in the Muslim world,
or of dealing with global injustice, or of allowing real
self-determination in the Third World, or anything else.
It's very clear that ramping up the soft power component of U.S.
dealings with the Muslim world (and, to some extent, the rest of the
Third World) would help, would be a definite improvement over the
cretinous hard power of the Bush administration, as exemplified in the
brutally stupid occupation of Iraq.
In the past, this has made a critical difference. After World War 2,
most people (perhaps with the exception of Latin Americans) did not see
the United States as imperialist. In the 1930's, the Saudis were very
clear that they wanted to give their oil concession to American
companies, because they feared and distrusted the British colonialists.
In fact, it's taken an enormous amount of effort by the United States
to make it sink even lower in Arab eyes than Britain, and almost as
low, for many, as Israel.
At this point, I think too much water has passed under the bridge. U.S.
support for Israel in the latest phase of the occupation (which started
in September 2000 and is usually known as the al-Aqsa intifada -- a
misnomer, because it is the Israelis who started the process and drove
it, not the Palestinians, as with the first intifada) started to tip
things over -- aided by the inauguration of al-Jazeera, which
constantly beams these images into the households of the Arab world.
The division of the world by the invasion of Iraq, and even more the
callousness and brutality of the occupation have taken this a step
further.
It's impossible to know for sure, but I think that we may well find
that to deal with this particular threat requires the evolution of a
new concept, entirely foreign to American foreign policy in the postwar
era -- not hard power, not soft power, but engagement without trying to
influence or control. So deeply are imperial hard and soft power
intertwined in every American institution and way of doing business
that it will be hard even to figure out what this concept would mean.
April 3,
2:10
pm EST. I'm off to the
airport. I'll be in Iraq until April 25. Mostly in Baghdad; I'll have
to figure out when I get there whether visiting other places is worth
the risk. Internet access is difficult except through cafes, but expect
to see daily notes about life in Iraq, as well as other commentary of
the kind you've been seeing. Inshallah.
The next post will probably be from Amsterdam's lovely Schiphol
International Airport.
A thought for the road. A Newsweek
poll conducted on Thursday and Friday. 65% of those polled said
Clarke's testimony has not affected their views of Bush, 17% that it
made them view him less favorably and, believe it or not, 10% say that
is made them view him more favorably.
Words fail me -- for now.
April 3,
1:14 pm
EST. Globalsecurity.org underestimated it. Turns out there are
U.S. troops in 135 countries (not including the U.S.). Here's a document that
spells out active duty personnel numbers by service, region, and
country. Thanks to a reader for the tip.
April 3,
11:50 am
EST. Thousands
of protesters marched in Baghdad to protest the closing
of the Moqtada al-Sadr-affiliated newspaper al-Hawza. In a speech
at the protest, al-Sadr declared his solidarity with Hezbollah and
Hamas and warned the Kurds not to cooperate with the occupation.
Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army is estimated at 6-10,000 people, and, several
weeks ago, destroyed
the small hamlet of Qawliya (about 150 homes). Most of the town's
residents were Gypsies and it was also known for its red-light district.
Al-Sadr, unlike Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is a believer in
theocracy, in particular in Khomeini's concept of Vilayat-i-Faqih (Rule
of the Just Jurist). He attracts support away from al-Sistani for two
reasons: he's Iraqi (al-Sistani is originally from Iran) and he's
militantly opposed to the occupation.
This is yet another way in which the occupation leads to more extremism
and internecine violence. Which some people then say shows that the
occupation must continue. What Iraq needs if it is to survive is to
reverse that logic and start moving towards a polity that will decrease
those tensions, not exacerbate them as the United States is doing.
April 3,
11:30 am
EST. Here's a little
piece in the Times Sunday Magazine by my favorite scribe of
imperialism and yours, Niall Ferguson. In addition to being a
phenomenal supercilious twit (I had the dubious pleasure of debating
him last year), he is so over the top that he does apologetics not only
for modern-day U.S. imperialism but for British colonialism.
In the piece, called "The Way We Live Now: Eurabia," he laments the
fact that Europe, with its free and tolerant society, is being taken
over by Muslim fanatics. Notwithstanding his supposed inclination
toward free societies, he even resurrects that favorite lament of
blood-and-soil nationalists everywhere -- Europeans have a low birth
rate and, of course, Muslims in countries near Europe have a high one.
Need anything more be said?Letters to letters@nytimes.com.
April 2,
8:22 pm
EST. The Associated
Press reports that the U.S.-France puppet regime in Haiti plans to
seek extradition of Aristide to face trial for extradition and human
rights violations. Gerard Latortue claims that Aristide may have
misappropriated $1 billion in government funds.
This sounds like nonsense just by virtue of the scale of the claims, if
nothing else. Even as a propaganda ploy, it seems like a bad idea for
them. If you want to try him in camera in the Central African Republic,
fine, but trying him in Haiti would catalyze public resistance to this
illegitimate new regime and possibly lead to a loss of control. A
government that found Aristide's presence in Jamaica to be a threat
should not be so sanguine about the prospect of Aristide in Haiti.
This call doesn't seem to be getting a lot of play in the newspapers
and I wonder if this is Latortue and company striking out on their own.
The Bush administration, in particular, has shown no great eagerness to
bring anyone to trial.
Aristide has also filed
suit in Paris for kidnap. The defendant named is "X."
April 2,
5:32 pm
EST. Here's a good
link for figuring out where our legions are posted around the world
-- in nearly 130 countries.
April 2,
2:47 pm
EST. Check out the New York
Times editorial on Fallujah. In the best tradition of
unclear-on-the-concept colonialism:
What the horrific images from Falluja
should
convey is that the fundamental problem is in Iraq itself. ...
Led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shiite majority, persecuted
for decades, insists on a version of democracy that enshrines Shiite
domination and fails to offer needed protections for minority groups.
This is clearly unacceptable to the Sunni minority in places like
Falluja, and to the Kurds.
So, the mob yelling "CIA" and "Falluja is the graveyard
of Americans"
were angry because of potential Shi'a domination, not because of the
scores of civilians killed by American military operations there (it's
also worth remembering that one of the big civilian kills of the Gulf
War was when a bomb fell in a marketplace in Falluja).
Don't get me wrong. Of course, Sunni Arabs in Iraq feel particularly
dispossessed and angry at losing their dominant political role. But
that doesn't generally lead to violence against Americans. Killing
civilians, home raids, flagrantly unjust detentions, creating mass
unemployment, disbanding the army -- those are the sources of armed
resistance. In Falluja it's particularly simple; the U.S. military has
angered the whole population with its brutality.
By the way, as this AFP
report says, Falluja was not a Saddam stronghold. It was, in fact,
a town of Sunni tribes that resisted domination by the central
government and, according to the story, "Under
Saddam, imams across the town refused to abide by his orders to praise
him personally during daily prayers." In addition, there was a
significant Salafist (extreme fundamentalist -- Wahhabism is a subset
of Salfism) presence in Falluja, and
Saddam heavily repressed anyone even vaguely suspected of Salafism.
The Times concludes with some wonderful critical
reflection, calling on Iraqis to shoulder their responsibility of
making their occupation by a foreign
power work:
No one - not Americans, Europeans or the U.N.
- can
impose a pluralistic democracy at gunpoint and make it stick. That can
happen only if enough influential Iraqis from all three communities
embrace a workable constitution and defend it against its many armed
enemies.
The word "occupation" does not appear in the editorial at
all. We just
know by divine revelation that all the armed attacks are attacks
against the constitution, not against the occupation. We're
trying to help some benighted natives build democracy, they have
internecine squabbles, and we're not being sufficiently bold about
making the natives realize that we can't do it for them while they laze
around -- they have to
help themselves. This could have been lifted out of a British editorial
about Iraq in 1920. If anyone has any such lying around, send them my way.
April 1,
9:10 pm
EST. Amazingly enough, there's an op-ed
in the LA Times by two "right-wing media veterans" whose analysis
of Air America's prospects is the same as mine, and focuses on the fact
that it seems to be about getting Kerry elected rather than building a
movement.
The right wing knows how to build movements. Liberals are not even sure
they want to. And the left is still marginal.
Thanks to Political Animal
for pointing out the article in his blog.
April 1,
4:05 pm
EST. More on Falluja. The four contractors who were killed and
dragged through the streets were described in initial reports as
civilians. In fact, they were employees of Blackwater Security, which,
as its website says, "has its roots in the Special Operations
Community." According to this
Mother Jones article from last year, in addition to providing
"security," they do counterterrorism trainings for the U.S. military.
Ex-Special forces guys in Falluja to consult on security and
counterterrorism -- not exactly civilians. And, in fact, later reports
have stopped using the word "civilian."
An article
in the LA Times, in fact, quotes one bystander as saying, "people
were saying they were CIA," which is not exactly far off the mark. It
quotes another Fallujah resident saying that the attacks were
retaliation for the attacks of last Friday, in which, according
to Reuters, U.S. Marines killed at least seven Iraqi civilians,
including a cameraman working for ABC (has any other country even come
close to killing as many journalists this year as the United States?)
and, according
to at least one eyewitness report, the Marines started firing
without provocation.
The attitude in Fallujah seems pretty clear -- "if you come in here and
kill
civilians, we'll do our best to kill you."
Bremer has vowed
that the culprits will not escape punishment and Brigadier General Mark
Kimmitt said these chilling words:
We will be back in
Fallouja. It will be at the time and the place of
our choosing. We will hunt down the criminals. We will kill them or we
will capture them. And we will pacify Fallouja.
Since it was a cross-section of the people of Falluja,
and not some
specific organization, that killed these four, this clearly means
collective reprisals against the whole town -- and, of course, this is
going to lead to the same result that all the earlier atrocities and
collective punishments in Falluja have led to -- starting
with the killings in late April of 2003.
The attitudes I saw on
my previous trip to Iraq (especially in Adhamiyah, the Sunni
neighborhood in Baghdad that is described as the center of resistance
in the capital) were very clear -- total opposition to American troops
and those who
are part of the occupation, but no particular desire to commit violence
against
others who happen to be foreign.
For example, we talked with a woman whose son had been killed by U.S.
forces. There was a demonstration in Adhamiyah when Saddam was
captured. He wasn't part of it, she had just sent him to tell his
father to close the shop and come home because she was worried, and he
got shot and killed on his way. She couldn't tell the story without
breaking down every few minutes, but she made a point of telling us
that we were welcome, that they had nothing against Americans, but that
the occupying forces were not welcome.
Obviously, there are some groups in
Iraq who are indiscriminately killing foreigners and Iraqi civilians.
To the best of my understanding (which is very limited, because there
don't seem to be resistance groups that make their politics known or
that put out statements condemning attacks like the Ashura attacks or
those on women who clean or do laundry for the CPA), there are also
groups that focus just on resisting the military occupation.
April 1,
2:40 pm
EST. Some readers ask what names was I referring to, a propos of
the liberal talk radio network Air America being named after a CIA
operation.
Well, Jim Hightower inaugurated in 2000 a traveling big-tent fun for
the whole family celebrity-filled political Lollapalooza-type event and
called it "Rolling Thunder," named after the bombing campaign Lyndon
Johnson inaugurated a few months after being elected president. And
Bill Clinton called the December 1998 bombing of Iraq (a regime-change
trial balloon) "Desert Fox," which was the nickname of Field Marshal
Erwin Rommel.
And, yes, much as I detest all three of these names, Bush's "Infinite
Justice," (which had to be shelved because of opposition) was
infinitely worse.
April 1,
9:10 am
EST. Kerry recently used
the opportunity of higher gas prices to make himself look foolish.
He is calling for the administration to put pressure on OPEC
countries to produce more and bring the price down, while
simultaneously touting his interest in reducing dependence on foreign
oil -- something that higher gas prices would do (and don't forget that
we have far lower gas prices than most of the First World). And has
Kerry the environmentalist forgotten that we contribute about five
times our share of world carbon emissions?
Cheney correctly ridiculed Kerry for his ridiculous flip-flop on this
issue, saying "After voting three times to increase the gas tax and
once proposing to
increase it by 50 cents a gallon, he now says he doesn't support it."
Best of all, Kerry spokeswoman Stephanie Cutter says, according to the
Post, that "Kerry will use his new proposal to fault Bush for not
applying adequate
diplomatic pressure on oil-producing nations during his
administration." Inadequate diplomatic pressure? If an attempted coup
in Venezuela and a war on and occupation of Iraq are not adequate, what
stronger measures is Kerry angling for?
April 1,
9:00 am
EST. Score one more for the rogue state. The International Court
of
Justice just
ruled that 51 Mexicans on death row in the United States were
illegally deprived of their right of consular assistance, guaranteed
under the 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, and said their
cases should be reviewed and reconsidered.
It's interesting that the U.S. bothered to argue the case in the ICJ,
because ever since 1986 it has denied that it recognizes the court's
authority.
April 1,
8:00 am
EST. The much-touted liberal talk radio network, Air America,
debuted yesterday. I caught a little bit of Al Franken fawning over Bob
Kerrey the war criminal, but the streaming audio feed wasn't working
very well.
Howard Kurtz does a hatchet
job on it in the Post. The article goes into great detail in
showing the nasty, divisive rhetoric hosts are using. And it is harsh
stuff, although I can't imagine Kurtz seriously expects us to recoil in
horror at depictions of Ann Coulter as a "borderline racist."
Harsh as it is, though, what's amazing is that normal conservative talk
radio, anywhere in the country at any time, is about ten times as
virulent but it basically occasions no comment. As well as being less
justified.
Al Franken is the main attraction for Air America right now. And he
clearly has the wrong vision for the network. An article on him in the
Times Sunday Magazine (March 21) said,
Though he says he is interested in
sticking
around, Franken has
reportedly signed only a one-year contract. "I'm doing this because I
want to use my energies to get Bush unelected," he told me. "I'd be
happy if the election of a Democrat ended the show."
Beating Bush is a fine and good goal (especially for a
political
middle-of-the-roader like Franken, who, according to the Times, thinks
the DLC is a "moral force for good"), but if the people who launched
conservative talk radio had had such a blinkered vision 25 years ago,
the country would be in a lot better shape than it is.
This is an important experiment and it is to be hoped that someone
involved has a longer-term strategy. It would also be nice if the
network has the courage to bring on guests who will talk about the
occupation of Iraq and the coup in Haiti, and who might even criticize
John Kerry
And, oh yeah, why oh why did they have to name it after a CIA operation
supporting the Vietnam War (and doing a little drug smuggling on the
side)? Reminds me of my peeve when Jim Hightower named his
neo-Chatauqua tour after Lyndon Johnson's major bombing campaign
targeting North Vietnam. At least they're a step up from Clinton naming
his bombing campaign against Iraq after a Nazi field marshal.
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